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Doc. Book 3

AGGRESSION AGAINST THE U. S. S. R.

Assistant Chief Prosecutor
of the USSR - State Councillor
of Justice, 3rd Class -

N. D. ZORYA

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May it please Your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence dealing with the aggression against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, organized by the fascist war criminals now sitting in the prisoners' dock.

This charge of the crime, mentioned in sub-paragraph "a", Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated by paragraph 6, Section 4, Count I, of the Indictment in the present case, and in Section IV of the Opening Statement by the Chief Prosecutor from the USSR, General Rudenko.

Among the many criminal wars which German fascism waged against freedom-loving nations with its predatory aims, the attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.

It can be safely said that the aggressive war against the Soviet Union was the key question of the whole fascist conspiracy against it. All aggressive actions on the part of German fascism committed prior to the attack on the USSR and in particular the German aggression against Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, were, as has been shown by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, just stages on the road to the attack on the Soviet Union.

The war against the Soviet Union was waged by fascist Germany with the intent of seizing the riches of our country and of plundering her peoples.

Ukrainian wheat and the coal of the Donbass, manganese of the Kola Peninsula and Caucasian crude oil, fertile steppes of the Volga region, and Byelorussian forests, played a decisive part in the criminal schemes of the fascist aggressors.

The war against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was waged by fascist Germany, also with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the Soviet peoples.

In the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full horrifying expression.

And finally, German imperialism appearing in its fascist edition, saw in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and in its immeasurable resources of food and raw materials

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a base for the realization of their far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve first hegemony in Europe and later on hegemony in the whole world.

The well-known formula of German imperialism "Drang nach Osten" which was mentioned in the Opening Statement of the Chief Prosecutor from the USSR, was at different times interpreted by the fascist criminals in many different ways, but always in their aggressive plans the attack on the Soviet Union was given a prominent place.

"If new territory is desired, wrote Hitler in his book "Mein Kampf", in substance it can be secured at the expense of Russia. The new Empire must move along the paths trodden by the knights of old".

(Hitler "Mein Kampf", Munich edition, 1930, page 742).

The fact that having at last initiated the fascist aggression in 1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change this basic conception of fascism.

Under # 789-PS the American prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939 between Hitler and the members of the German High Command.

At this conference, Hitler according to his own words "gave a survey of the thoughts which dominated him in connection with the forthcoming events".

In the course of this survey he declared:

"For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West... It came about by force of events that for the nearest future the East dropped out of the picture". (Page 2 of the Russian text).

This statement by Hitler bore witness to the fact that the attack on the Soviet Union was not eliminated from the plans of fascist aggression and the whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most favorable moment for this attack.

It should be noted that the authors of fascist aggression did not consider the version "West" as the most favorable version for its start.

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3.

Again, exactly five months prier to the above-mentioned conference at the conference of 23 May 1939 (USA exhibit # 79) Hitler briefed his accomplices - "on the present situation and political aims" of policy, and said:

"If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East".

(page 4 of the Russian text).

In the idea of the Hitlerite conspirators, the vast spaces of the East were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the West.

Therefore, when the fascist hordes were unable to force the channel, stopped at its shores and had to find new ways of aggression, the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union, because this was the bases part of all their plans of aggression, without which they could not materialize.

I believe it is unnecessary to refer to documents of an earlier period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" where questions connected with the predatory attack on the Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.

This book is already before the Tribunal and relevant parts of it were cited as evidence by our American and British colleagues.

The Soviet prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a file of documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of fascist Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed with malice aforethought.

Among these documents, there are files from various archives captured by units of the advancing Red Army, statements by fascist leaders, published in the press, including those by several of the defendants, and depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually carried out.

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The documents of the Soviet prosecution are presented under the following sections.

1. Proparations for war in Germany itself.
2. Assuring the security of the preparations for war by intelligence activities.
3. The securing by the fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite countries inthe aggression against the Soviet Union.

I. Preparations for war in Germany itself.

The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for a long time been ripe in the minds of the Fascist conspirators.

But apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.

On the 18th December 1940 the directive known to the Tribunal as directive # 21, "Plan Barbarossa" (the document of the American prosecution numbered 446-PS)- received its official formulation.

When the signature of the Command appears on such a document, this is the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all the links in the chain of military administration.

This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy surrounding this work often made it necessary to have recourse to verbal orders. And, on the other hand / many orders of a routine nature, on the strength of an already existing strategic project, acquire a corresponding purpose although outwardly they seem to have no connection with it.

It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began, it is not only documents that can help (as things are not always put on paper), but also the testimony of persons who participated directly in making these preparations.

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Among the series of documents which the Soviet prosecution has at its disposal is the evidence of Walther Warlimont, given by him to the representative of the Soviet prosecution, General Alexandrov, on the 13th November 1945.

I present this document as evidence under USSR No. 263.

Walther Warlimont was, as is known, the chief of the Department of National Defence in the O.K.W., and later Deputy Chief of the Operational Staff.

I shall read that part of his deposition which touches on the question before us:

"... Personally I first heard of this plan on the 29th July 1940.

... On that day Colonel-General Jodl arrived in a special train at Reichenhall station, where department "L" of the Operational Staff was... This struck one immediately, because General Jodl had, till then, never, I believe, come to see us. Besides myself, 3 other officers were ordered to present themselves... I cannot repeat what he said word for word, but the meaning was the following: Jodl declared that the Fuehrer had decided to prepare for a war against Russia. The Fuehrer based this on the fact that war had to come in one way or another, so that it would be better to prosecute this war in connection with the one already being fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations for it... here or somewhat later Jodl declared that Hitler intended to begin the war against the Soviet Union in autumn 1940 already, but later gave up this plan. The reason for this was that the strategic concentration of the army could not be finished by then. The necessary prerequisites for it were not available in Poland - railways, billets for the army and bridges were not ready... means of communication & aerodromes - all were still not organised... For this reason an order was given to hasten all the prerequisites for preparing & carrying out such a campaign.

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Question: That was the order of the 9th August 1941, "Aufbau Ost" (build up in the East)?

Answer: Yes, This order was drawn up by the Operational Staff on the orders of General Jodl ... In General Jodl's opinion, the concentration could be carried out only after all the preparations laid down in this order had been made."

Further on, Warlimont declared that the project for Plan Barbarossa, which was first called "Fritz", was presented to Hitler on the 5th December 1940, after which it was edited & saw the light of day on the 18th December.

I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former field marshal of the German army, who took the most direct part both in the preparations & in the execution of "Plan Barbarossa", can give considerable help in the investigation of questions connected with the history of the preparation of this plan.

I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus as USSR 156 and request that it be accepted as evidence.

I shall now read that part of Paulus' testimony which refers to the history of the preparation of plan Barbarossa.

(In the text, the portions read are underlined in red pencil on pages 1 & 2, to facilitate its use.)

"From the 3rd September 1940 to the 18th January 1942 I held the post of Quartermaster-General on the General Staff of the Army. Among my tasks were those of deputising for the Chief of the General Staff and fulfilling his special tasks. Only in autumn 1941 did I begin to be in charge of departments of the General Staff. Of these, the training & organisational departments were subordinated to me.

At the time in question, the Chief of General Staff of the Army was Colonel General Halder.

On beginning my service in the O.K.H. on the 3rd September 1940, I found there, among other plans, a still unfinished preparatory operational plan for an attack on the Soviet Union, known under the code-name "Barbarossa".

...This plan, which was being worked out on the orders of the OKW, was handed over to me by Colonel-General Halder, with the task of analysing the possibility of offensive operations,

taking into account local conditions, the utilisation of forces, etc. and using 130 to 140 divisions.

As designed by the OKW, the operational task was: first to seize Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine, and later the Northern Caucasus with its oil fields. The final goal was envisaged as the attainment approximately of the Astrakhan-Archangel line.

The goals alone characterise the plan as preparation for the purest aggression; the same is apparent from the fact that the plan made no provisions whatsoever for any defensive measures".

I have quoted the evidence of military specialists who were able, owing to their position in the OKW and OKH, to obtain the most reliable information.

During the morning session of 30 November 1945 the witness Lahousen was cross-examined and gave testimony which is quite interesting.

Among other things the witness named Pickenbrock among the closest collaborators of Canaris / Chief of the German Army's Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services.

I present to the Tribunal, as USSR # 228, the testimony of the former chief of section I of the German Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Services, Lieutenant-General Hans Pickenbrock, Lahousen's former chief and colleague.

At the moment I should like to read the following lines from Pickenbrock's testimony (underlined in red pencil on p.1 of the Russian text).

"... I must say that already since August and September 1940 the Foreign Army's Section of the General Staff began to increase considerably its intelligence assignments to the "Abwehr" (Counter-Intelligence) concerning the USSR. These assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation of war against Russia.

The more precise dates for Germany's attack on the Soviet Union I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the Soviet Union was fixed for the 15th May".

The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of the German Army,

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given by him on the 28th December 1945. I present this testimony to the Tribunal as USSR 230.

I shall at the moment also read only those parts of Bentivegni's testimony - they are underlined in red pencil - which have direct bearing on the question of the commencement of preparations for war against the Soviet Union:

"I first came to know of Germany's preparations for a military attack on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German Intelligence & Counter-Intelligence Service, Admiral Canaris. In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris' office, he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938 in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiters in Berlin.

... Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler's had now begun to take concrete form. This was evident even from the fact that divisions of the German army were being transferred in large numbers from the West to the Eastern frontiers and, in accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia.

(First 2 paragraphs of Bentivegni's evidence).

And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time at which Fascist Germany's military preparations for the treacherous attack on the Soviet Union took place, I should like to pause at the testimony of General Mueller. I present this testimony to the Tribunal as USSR 149. All the material which I have quoted so far came from the circles of the highest commands of the German army.

General Mueller belongs, if one can express it thus, to the central link of the body of German generals. He was the Chief of Staff of the Army & commanded an Army Corps. His testimony reflects a series of events which can be acknowledged as deserving attention. I shall read the first pages of this testimony (marked in red pencil).

"The preparation for the attadk on the Soviet Union began as early as July 1940. At that time I was chief of staff of "C" Army Group at Dijon in France. General Field Marshal von Leeb was in command.

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This army group consisted of the 1st, 2nd & 7th armies, which were occupation armies in France. Besides this, army group "A" (Rundstedt), whose task was to prepare operation "Sealion" (the invasion of England) and army group "B" (von Bock) were also in France. During the course of July, the staff of army group "B" was transferred to the East (Poznan). The staff of army group "B" was given the following forces, transferred from France (part of the armies of occupation): The 12th, 4the & 18th Armies plus some other corps & about 30 divisions. Of this number, some of the divisions were taken from army group "B".

Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order for the demobilisation of 20 divisions. This orders was cancelled, & the 20 division were not demobilised. Instead of this, after their return to Germany, they were sent on leave & thus kept ready for quick mobilzation.

Both measures - the transfer of about 500.000 men to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order disbanding about 300.000 men, show that already in July 1940, plans existed for war operations in the east.

The next order which gives evidence of Germany's preparations for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued in September 1940, regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new army (the 11th), several army corps and about 40 infantry divisions. The forming of these units was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the Commander of the reserve army (Colonel General Fromm), partly in France but mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the O.K.H. called me to Fontainebleau. The Quartermaster General of the 1-st General Staff of the Land Forces, Lt. General (afterwards Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the order that my staff (the staff of Army group "C") was to be transferred to Dresden by November 1-st, and the staff of the 2nd Army (Colonel General Weichs), which formed part of this Army group, - to Munich (also by November 1st).

The task consisted in the direction of the preparations for war of the newly forme 40 divisions mentioned above.

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In accordance with this order, confirmed later on by a written order, signed by the Chief of General Staff, Halder, the transfer of these units was carried out on time. At the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, these 40 divisions were brought into action."

The preparations which were begun in this manner for the military attack on the Soviet Union were conducted with increased speed and with German punctiliousness and accuracy.

I ask permission to return to the deposition of Friedrich Paulus already submitted by me, and to quote now that part of the deposition which concerns the development of military measures for the preparation of the aggression against the USSR. .

"...preparatory measures in accordance with plan "Barbarossa" had, towards the end of 1940, made considerable progress.

The elaboration of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa", begun in August 1940, concluded with 2 military exercises under my leadership at the Headquarters of the O.K.H. at Zossen.

There were present at these exercises Colonel General Halder, the chief of the Operational Section of the General Staff, Colonel Häusinger and specially invited senior staff officers from the OKH.

The results of these exercises, which formed the basis of the elaboration of the "Barbarosse", directives for the strategic deployment of fordes showed that the distributions anticipated on the line Astrakhan-Archangel. - the furthest target of the OKW, would lead to the complete overthrow of the Soviet State, which was actually the intention of the aggressive action by the OKW, and the final aim of this war: to transform Russia into a colony ...

The decisive factor in the further preparatory work under plan "Barbarossa" was that, by its directive of 18 December 1940, the OKW decided that the offensive should be started approximately in the middle of May 1941.

The reason for the fixing of this date may be explained by the climatic conditions in Russia.

Simultaneously, the circle of collaborators was enlarged by the inclusion of the Commanders of the three army groups designated

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who were initiated into all the details of the plan at the conference of the OKH in Zossen.

These commanders were: Infantry General von Sonderstern for the future army group "South". Infantry General von Salmuth for group "Centre" and Lnt.General Brennecke for group "North".

At the same time, Hitler, in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, confirmed the operations planned by the OKH and submitted to him by Brauchitsc and Halder, and gave the order for the preparation of the final directives for the strategic deployment of forces.

In this way, the military command definitely decided to break the treaty and to attack, starting an aggressive war against the Soviet Union.

The further elaboration of the plan was taken over by the Chief of the Operational Staff. Colonel Haeusinger, who was directly subordinated to the Chief of General Staff.

On February 3rd 1941 at Berchtesgaden according to Brauchitsch's report Hitler in the presence of Keitel and Jodl, confirmed the "Barbarossa" directive for the strategic deploryment of forces.

Accompaning Brauchtsch, there were also present the Chief of the Operational Staff, Colonel Haeusinger, the Quartermaster General Wagner, the Chief of transport, general Goerke and myself, acting as deputy to the Chief of General staff, who was on leave.

As usual, after the military games had been carried out at OKH, they were then put into effect by the army groups.

General Mueller mentions this in his deposition to which I now refer again.

I quote those parts of the deposition which are underlined in blue pencil on pages 2 and 3 of the Russian text.

"In so far as the actual task of the army was the preparation for the attack on Soviet Russia, in the first place there stood the question of training the forces and officers of the general Staff in accordance with this plan.

Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders from the Chief of General Staff, Halder, to attend the military exercises at St.Germain (near Paris) of Rundstedt's army group. The task of the military

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exercises was the offensive from Rumania and southern Poland in the direction of Kiev and to the south of it. The manoeuvres were conducted in such a manner as if the Rumanian forces were also participating. In the main these military exercises anticipated the conditions of the future order concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will refer later. The director of the military exercises was the Chief of Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present: Rundstedt, Halden, the chiefs of staff: of the 6th army Colonel Heim, of the I/th army Colonel Weler and of Kleist's tank group - Colonel Zwickler, and several generals of the armoured forces"... The military exercise were held at the place occupied by Rundstedt's army group, approximately between the 31st January and 2rd February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces".

The documents I have presented up to now characterize the measures undertaken by the military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the strategic deployment of the German armies for the attack on the Soviet Union.

As for the time, these measures took up a considerable part of 1940 and began at least 6 months before directive # 21 re plan Barbarossa has appeared.

II. Intelligence activities.

I should now to pause at the documents bearing evidence of another group of measures, which in preparation for the aggression against the USSR, were taken during the course of 1940 by the Supreme Command of the armies of Fascist Germany.

I have in mind the measures in the field of intelligence and counter--intelligence.

The direction and tasks of the intelligence work in connection with plan Barbarossa were defined, as it is known, by a directive of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, addressed to Counter-Intelligence on the 6th September 194C and signed by the Defendant Jodl.

This document was presented by the American prosecution under # 1229-PS.

It was demanded of the intelligence organs that the regrouping of the armies on Germany's Eastern frontier should be concealed in every way and that the Soviet Union should be given the impression that some action was being prepared in the Balkans.

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The activities of the intelligence organs were strictly regulated. These activities consisted of taking measures to conceal as far as possible the numbers of the German forces in the East, so as to give impression of an inconsiderable concentration of forces in the northern part of the Eastern provinces and, on the contrary, of an extremely large concentration in their southern part, in the Protectorate and in Austria.

The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of the number of antiaircraft units and of the inconsiderable scope of road-building activities etc.

At this point it is necessery to make two pertinent observations. According to Pickenbrock's testimony the intensification of the work of intelligence organs against the Soviet Union began before the appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work of course was not limited to spreading of false infromation on the regrouping of forces from the west to the east, which was going on.

I beg you to return to the testimony of the former chief of Dept.III of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service of the German Army, von Bentivegni, which I have presented.

On pages 1, 2 and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni's deposition, states as follows (underlined in blue pencil):

"... As early as November 1940 I received from Canaris orders to intensify the work of counter-intelligence in the localities where concentration of the German armies on the Soviet-German frontier was taking place.

In accordance with this order, I immediately gave the organs of the German military intelligence and counter-intelligence, "Abwehrstelle", "Koenigsberg", "Cracow", "Breslau", "Vienna", "Danzig" and "Poznan", the task of intensifying the counter-intelligence work ...

... In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives for the preparations to the execution of the Plan Barbarossa:

a) Preparation of all links of "Abwehr III" (Counter-Intelligence, dept.III) for carrying out active counter-intelligence work against the Soviet Union - as for instance; the creation of the necessary counter-intelligence groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended for taking part in the operations on the eastern front, paralysing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence organs:

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b)Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow against Great Britain.

c)Counter intelligence measures to keep secret the preparations being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the transfer of troops to the East be kept secret."

In the record I have presented of the interrogation of Pickenbrock, the former chief of Dept I of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service of the German Army, is to be found the following excerpt, referring to the activity of these organs in connection with the preparation and execution of plan Barbarossa:

(I shall read the part underlined in blue pencil on pp. 2 and 3 of the Russian text.)

... In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the head of the Diversion and Sabotage Dept, "Abwehr II", Col. Lahousen, about measures connected with "plan Barbarossa", during this conversation they kept a referring to a written order on this subject, which Lahousen had

I personally, as head of "Abwehr I", beginning in February 1941 and up to the 22nd June 1941, more than once had official talks with the head of the foreign armies' department of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Tiepelskirch and with the head of the "East" department, Col. Kinzel. These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various tasks ascigned to "Abwehr" with regard to the Soviet Union, and in particular with the verification of old intelligence data about the Red Army, and also detals about the dislocation of the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.

... The field offices of the "Abwehrstelle", which were working against Russia, were given the task of intensifying the despatch of agents to the USSR. A similar task-the intensification of espionage work against Russia - was given to all intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of all these "Abwehr" organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941, under the code-name "Wally I."

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"Major Baun, as the best specialist on work against Russia, was appointed to direct operation "Wally I". Later, when, following our example, "Abwehr-2" and "Abwehr-3" had also established staffs "Wally-2" and "Wally-3", this organ became known as a whole, as staff "Wally", and directed the entire intelligence, counter-intelligence and diversionary work against the USSR. At the head of staff "Wally" was Lieut-Colonel Schmalschlaeger.

From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried out by this department. In the period February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of "Abwehr-2" took place at the quarters of Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a Cavalry School, in the small town of Krampnitz. One particular question settled at these conferences, in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units "Brandenburg-800 and of distributing contingents of these units amongst the individual army groups".

Noteworthy in Pickenbrock's testimony which has just been read, are his references to special tasks with which Lahousen's department was entrusted and to special task units known under the Code name "Brandenburg 800".

These points are clarified by the testimony of a former Colonel of the German Army, Erwin Stoltze, who was Lahousen's deputy in the 2nd department of the German Military Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Service at the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces.

I respectfully submit to the Tribunal Stoltze's testimony of the 25th December 1945 as Document No. USSR-231 and beg that it may be accepted as evidence. I will read extracts from this evidence which are underlined with red pencil. Pros. 11

"....I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under Code name "A", which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of disintegration

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of the Soviet rear, in connection with the intended attack on USSR.

At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order, which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and was signed by Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl (or General Varlimont, on Keitel's instructions, I do not quite remember), and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the USSR after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union.

The order in question was for the first time marked with the code name "Barbarossa."

It was pointed out in the order that, for the purpose of delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, "Abwehr-2", in conducting subversive work against Russia, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism amongst the peoples of the Soviet Union.

In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian nationalists, who were in the German Intelligence Service, and other members of the nationalist fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above.

In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian nationalists, the German agents Myelnik (code-name "Consul I") and Bandera, to organize, immediately upon Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine, in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies and also to convince International public opinion of the alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.

We also prepared special diversionist groups for subversive activities in the Baltic Soviet Republics.

...Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory - a special duty training regiment "Brandenburg 800", under the immediate command of the head of "Abwehr-2" - Lahousen.

Amongst the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points - bridges, tunnels and defence installations, and holding them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army. In addition, contrary to the international rules for the conduct of war, the personnel of the regiments, formed mainly of Germans from beyond the frontiers, made wide use of the adversary's army uniforms, equipment and arms, in order to camouflage their operations.

During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on the USSR, the command of the "Brandenburg - 800" regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment and arms, and organised separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language"....

Stolze's, Bentivegni's and Pickenbrock's testimony submitted by me, disclose the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of "Plan Barbarossa".

I shall no longer occupy the attention of the Tribunal with these questions. But before I continue further with my presentation, I should like to point out that intelligence work in Germany was also the subject of activities by the defendant Kaltenbrunner's department. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is characteristic of how the Hitlerites, by using their connections, created diffieulties in Iran, through which, as is known, the routes passed for the delivery to the USSR of moter vehicles and of the most varied war materials.

The document, which I intend to submit to the honourable Tribunal as USSR 178, was taken by us from the German Foreign Office Archives, which were captured by the advancing units of the Red Army. This is the defendant Kaltenbrunner's letter to the defendant Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD.

Flt. 11

I quote extracts from this letter, which are underlined:

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"28.7.1943.

Secret.

To the Foreign Minister Herr von Ribbentrop

Berlin.

Elections to the Iranian Parliament.

Highly respected Herr Minister,

We have made direct contact with Iran and have received... information on the possibilities of German influence on the course of the Iranian Parliamentry elections .... in order to have a decisive influence on the elections, bribes are necessary.

For Teheran - 400,000 Tumans and for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 Tumans are necessary.

It should be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect Germany's intervention.

I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to get one million Tumans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent with the people whom we are sending there by aeroplane.

Heil Hitler.

Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner - SS Obergruppenfuehrer.

This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions which interested The Reich Foreign Minister.

Such a peculiar activity of the Foreign Office was not a chance episode.

In the course of time, the touching co-operation of the Foreign Office and the Reich Fuehrer SS strengthened and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which can be entitled an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organisation of intelligence work.

I submit this document as USSR No. 120.

7.11.11

The text of this agreement is as follows (I read the marked parts):

"By the order dated the 12th February 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation

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of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Fuehrer has established that the direction of the intelligence service, in so far as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfuehrer SS was arrived at:

1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Fuehrer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely and loyal cooperation between the Foreign Office and the headquarters of the Reich Security Services. The collection of information on foreign politics by the Diplomatic Service is not affected by this.

2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the headquarters of the Reich Security Services the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the intelligence service and the directive regarding German foreign policy; it hands over to the Headquarters of the Reich Security Serviees its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.

3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed by the headquarters of the Reich Security Services at the disposal of the Foreign Office. The same applies to intelligence information in the economic sphere, as well as to intelligence information in the military and technical spheres, so far as it is of importance for foreign politics.

4. Intelligence material concerning foreign politics which comes from the headquarters of the Reich Security Services, is supplied to the Fuehrer, in so far as it is of interest to the latter, by the Reich Foreign Minister, as the material of the headquarters of the Reich Security Services. If, owing to official considerations, the Reich Fuehrer SS deems it necessary to inform

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the Fuehrer of any question which is directly within his province, such material will also be supplied simultaneously to the Reich Foreign Minister....

... The foreign Office will give all possible help to the Secret Intelligence Service. The Reich Foreign Minister will .... include certain employees of the Intelligence Service among the personnel of the foreign missions....

The responsible employee of the Intelligence Service will give regular information to the head of the mission on all essential questions concerning the activities of the Secret Intelligence Service in a given country.

7. In order to carry out the exchange of intelligence material and to facilitate co-operation between the Foreign Office and the Reichsfuehrer, or the Headquarters of the Reich Security Services in the sphere of the Secret Intelligence Service, - the Political department of the Foreign Office, on the one hand, and the Headquarters of the Reich Security Services (department VI) on the other, will each appoint one responsible person.

The task of both these people consists in securing, by means of constant personal contact, co-operation in accordance with the present agreement.

H. Himmler Ribbentrop. "

The document just submitted shows how difficult it was to understand the conditions in Fascist Germany, to see where Himmler's Gestapo department ended and where the defendant Ribbentrop's Foreign Office began.

This document allows us to state that, under the title of German Diplomatic missions in countries which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a wide Gestapo network was actually at work.

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III Germany's Satellites.

When the plan "Barbarossa" was read at Court, in my opinion, only one part of the whole plan received comparatively little attention.

I have in mind part 2 of the "Barbarossa" version (No. 446-PS) bearing the name of "Presumed allies and their tasks".

It is on the questions dealt with in this part that I would like to detain the Tribunal's attention.

In the first place, allow me to remind you of the contents of this part:

"2. Presumed Allies and their tasks.

1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.

The Supreme Command of the German Army will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.

2. Rumania's task will be to tie up , incooperation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.

3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German Northern landing group (units of the XXI groups) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to liquidate the Russian Forces in Hango.

4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish Railways and Coals being available for the movements of the German Northern group not later than the beginning of the operation.

In the speech of the chief prosecutor from the USSR - General Rudenko - attention was drawn to the sentence which begins this section:

"On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Rumania & Finland in the war against Soviet Russia."

This enabled the chief prosecutor of USSR to point out, in his speech, the fact that on the 18.12.41,(the date of the "Barbarossa" document) Rumania and Finland were already following in the wake of the Hitlerite conspirators' predatory policies.

There is yet another document which was submitted by the American prosecution and which mentions Germany's presumed allies in her aggression against the USSR.

This is the document bearing the number C-39 and entitled "Provisional Plan Barbarossa". It is, as defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a calendar plan of the preparations for Plan Barbarossa after the 1st June 1941. This plan was confirmed by Hitler.

In part 2 of this document entitled "Negotiations with Friendly Powers", we read:

a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons, on the Turkish frontier.

b) The Rumanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Rumania, a partial, camouflaged mobilisation in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.

c) Hungarian territory will be used for the advance of the Southern Army Group only in so far as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Rumanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.

d) Two German divisions have entered the Eastern part of Slovakia, the next ones will be landed in the area of Prossy.

e)Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General staff take place as from the 25th May."

Paulus, referring to the preparation of Rumania for aggression against Soviet Union, makes the following statement: (middle of page 2 of the Russian text of the document, down to the end, and 2 lines on page 3).

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and 2 lines on p. 3. 23.

"... The future partner in the aggression - Rumania, which from the very beginning of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa" - was considered as the jumping off ground for the attack, will also commence advance preparations.

In September 1940, on the orders of the OKW, a military mission and the 13th armoured division, as a model unit, were sent to Rumania.

At the head of the military mission was put Cavalry General Hansen.

Major-General Hauffe, was appointed as his Chief of Staff, Major Merk as chief quartermaster. The 13th armoured division was commanded by Major-General von Rotkirch.

The task of the military mission was to reorganise the Rumanian army and to prepare it for the attack on the Soviet Union in the spirit of the "Barbarossa" plan. Preliminary briefing for this task was given to General Hansen and to his Chief of Staff by me, and the task itself by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Brauchitsch.

General Hansen received his instructions from two sources: in questions concerning the military mission - from the OKW; in questions dealing with the army - from the OKH; directives of a military-political nature came only from the OKW. Liaison between the German General Staff and the Rumanian General Staff was carried out by the military mission."

Formal agreements, and, still more, the public announcements of the true intentions of the Fascist masters of the satellite countries were not always deemed convenient.

I present the written record of Ion Antonescu's conference with the defendant Ribbentrop, which took place on February 12th 1942, under document No. USSR 233.

In connection with Ribbentrop's speech in Budapest on Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following entry (The last paragraph of p. 2 of the Russian text of the document).

"Without hesitation, I stressed the point that, as early as the beginning of September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by monsieur Michael Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers; I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to folow a policy which no doubt could appear only infamous".

While making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected it to receive wide publicity.

It seems to me that this is the most suitable moment for making puplic the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet prosecution has at its disposal, and which is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the relationship between Germany and her satellites.

I submit this testimony as U.S.S.R. No. 153 and beg the honourable Tribunal to accept it as evidence. I will begin reading at the 2nd paragraph on page I of the testimony:

"Throughout the period when I held power in Rumania, - Ion Antonescu testifies, - I followed the policy of strengthening the links with Germany and used her help for re-training and re-arming the Rumanian army. For this purpose I met Hitler several times.

The first meeting with Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head of the Rumanian Goverment. This meeting took place on my initiative, in Berlin, at Hitler's official residence in the presence of the German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop

and Hitler's personal interpreter Schmidt.

Discussions with Hitler lasted more then four hours.

I assured Hitler that Rumania remained true to the previously concluded agreement regarding Rumania's adherence to the "Tripartite pact".

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In answer to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany, Hitler declared that the German soldiers guaranteed Rumania's frontiers.

At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration ... was not the last word, and by this gave me to understand that Rumania could count on the reconsideration of the decision on Transylvania, previously taken in Vienna.

Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Rumania should continue its work of reconstructing the Rumanian Army on the German pattern, and should also concluded an economic agreement, in accordance with which the Germans later on will supply Rumania with Mersserschmidt-109s, tanks, tractors, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, automatic rifles and other armaments, while they will receive from Rumania, in return, corn and oil for the needs of the German armies.

To the question put to me as to whether my conversation with Hitler could be regarded as the beginning of my agreement with the Germans on the preparations for war against the Soviet Union, - I replied in the affirmative.

This circumstance Hitler had unquestionably in mind, when developing his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union.

In January, 1941, I was invited to Germany through the medium of the German ambassador in Rumania - Fabricius, and met Hitler for the second time, in Berchtesgaden, when the following persons were present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius and the newly appointed German Ambassador to Bucharest - Kellinger. Besides these, there were also present representatives of the German armed forces - Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel - General Jodl.

At the beginning of the conversations, Hitler, in introducing Kellinger to me, stressed that the latter was his best friend.

After this, Hitler, in describing the military situation in the Balkans, declared that, in connection with the Italian failures in the war with Greece, Mussolini, had appealed to him for help, and this help he, Hitler, intended to give to Italy.

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In this connection, Hitler asked me to allow the German troops concentrated on Hungarian territory, to pass across Rumania, so that they could render speedy assistance to the Italians.

Having in mind that the passage of German troops through Rumania to the Balkans would constitute an act hostile to the Soviet Union, I asked Hitler how, in his opinion, the Soviet Government would react to it.

Hitler, having reminded me that, at our first meeting in November 1940, he had already given appropriate guarantees to Rumania, took upon himself the obligation of protecting Rumania with armed force.

I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through Rumania might give rise to military operations on the part of the Soviet Union, and that Rumania would then be in a difficult position, as the Rumanian army had not been mobilized, - to which Hitler declared that he would give orders for some of the German troops intended for participation in the operations against Greece, to be left in Rumania.

Hitler stressed, too, that the information at his disposal showed that the Soviet Union did not intend to fight Germany or Rumania.

Satisfied with this declaration by Hitler, I agreed to permit the passage of German troops through Rumanian territory.

Colonel General Jodl who was present at this conference, described to me the strategic dispositions of the German army and stressed the necessity for a blow against Greece launched from Bulgaria.

My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.

At this meeting, at which besides ourselves, there were present Ribbentrop and Hitler's personal interpreter, Schmidt, we finally reached an agreement about the combined attack on the Soviet Union.

Hitler informed me that he had decided on a military attack on the Soviet Union. Having prepared this attack, Hitler said, we must carry it out

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unexpectedly along the whole length of the Soviet Union's frontiers from the Black Sea to the Baltic.

The unexpectedness of the attack, Hitler went on to say, would give Germany and Rumania a chance to liquidate, within a short time, one of our most dangerous adversaries.

On the basis of his military plans, Hitler made a suggestion that I should permit the use of Rumanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and should at the same time participate directly in carrying out the military attack on the Soviet Union.

Hitler stressed the point that Rumania must not remain outside this war, because, to have Bessarabia and North Bucovina returned to her, she had no other alternative, but to fight on Germany's side. At the same time, he pointed out that, in return for our assistance in the war, Rumania would be able to occupy and administer other Soviet territories too, up to the River Dnieper.

As Hitler's offer to begin the war against the USSR jointly, corresponded to my aggressive intentions, I announced that I agreed, to participate in the attack on the Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number of Rumanian troops and at the same time to increase the deliveries of the oil and agricultural products needed by the German armies.

Before I and Hitler took the decision to attack Russia, I asked Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding her participation in the war. Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their consent to take part in the war against the USSR in alliance with Germany. When exactly the Germans had agreed on this with the Hungarians, Hitler did not tell me.

On my return from Munich to Bucarest I began active preparations for the coming war.

After the invasion of Soviet territory, the Rumanian troops under my supreme command rendered great help to the Germans, and in this connection Hitler sent a letter addressed to me with the expression of his gratitude to me and to the Rumanian army.

This deposition has been written by me with my own hand.

Signed Marshal Antonescu.

The testimony of the former Vice-Minister of the Rumanian Government, Michael Antonescu, which I present to the Tribunal as document # USSR-152, the date when Rumania started her preparations for war against the Soviet Union.

Michael Antonescu testifies (page 1 of the Russian text, par.1,2 and 5):

"In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu accompanied by Prince Struza who was then the Minister for Foreign Affairs, left for Germany, where he had a meeting with Hitler.

During the negociations with Hitler Marshal Antonescu signed the agreement for Rumania's adherence to the "Tripartite Pact" and received Hitler's promise for the subsequent reconsideration of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitrage, in favor of Rumania ...

This voyage of Marshal Antonescu was the first stoo towards a policy which afterwards led to a joint German and Rumanian attack against the Soviet Union".

These same facts were also confirmed by the former Chief Inspector of Rumanian Gendarmeris, Constantin Vassiliou, whose testimony I present to the Tribunal as document # USSR-232.

Vassiliou testifies, as follows: (par.I, 1st page of the testimony)

"Rumanian preparations for war against the USSR begun already towards the end of 1940, when the German military mission - on Marshal Antonescu's request - arrived in Bucharest".

Paulus' testimony as well as those of Ion Antonescu, Michael Antonescu and Vassiliou, just submitted to the Tribunal, enable the Soviet Prosecution to make the following statement:

1. The decision to send to Rumania a Military Mission of the German General Staff for the reorganisation of the Rumanian army, in order to prepare it for the attack against the USSR, was taken not later than September 1940, i.e. at least nine months prior to the attack on the USSR.

2. By November of the same year, Rumanian war preparations were fully developed.

I submit to the Tribunal, as document #USSR 154, the testimony of Rumanian former War Minister, Pantasi, which describes in detail the course of these preparations.

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Pantazi testified:

"Rumania's preparations for war against the Soviet Union began in November 1940, when, in accordance with the agreement signed by Marshal Antonescu regarding Rumania's adherence to the "Tripartite Pact", there arrived in Bucarest the German military missions, consisting of groups of German officer-instructors, those for the army headed by Colonel-General Hansen, and those for the air force - by major General Speidel.

With the arrival of the German military missions in Rumania, the chief of General Staff of the Rumanian Army, General Joanitiu issued an order to the army, on direction of Marshal Antonescu, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganising and retraining the Rumanian forces in accordance with the code of regulations of the German Army.

At the same time, on Marshal Antonescu's orders, all reserve officers of the Rumanian army were called up for two month's retraining, and underwent instruction under German direction.

During the period of the re-training of reserve officers, the General Staff of the Rumanian Army developed a plan for calling up into the army, of 12 age groups subject to mobilisation, in case of war, training of all these groups to be done in accordance with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army, and to be completed by the 1st July 1941. The personnel of the Supreme and Senior commands of the Rumanian armies underwent similar re-training in their respective branches of service.

In this way, under the leadership of the Germans, at the beginning of Rumania's and Germany's war against the Soviet Union, the whole of the Rumanian Army and Air Force were reorganised and re-trained on the German pattern.

In December 1940 there arrived in Rumania from Germany the "Todt" organisation, which began at once the construction of strategic roads leading to the frontiers with the USSR.

At the end of 1940 Marshal Antonescu formed, under his own leadership, a Co-ordinating Committee.

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At the Committee conferences, questions concerning Rumania's preparations for war against the USSR were discussed, and, in particular, the question of the construction of fortified areas, the question of armaments, of mobilizing Rumanians for the army, of the reorganisation and training of the army on German lines, of supplies, and of securing transport for the Rumanian forces during the war.

In January 1941 Marshal Antonescu, on his return from Germany, where he had met Hitler, called a meeting of the Co-ordinating Commitee, at which all the aforementioned people were present, and announced that Germany would soon have to begin war against the Soviet Union and that, therefore, as Antonescu declared, Rumania must prepare energetically for this war in order to fight against the USSR at Germany's side.

For this purpose, Antonescu suggested that we should intensify work in the army in order that Rumania should be fully prepared for the commencement of military operations.

In this connection, the following units, which were already mobilised and ready for action against the Soviet Union, were in February 1941 directed to the frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia on Marshal Antonescu's orders: the 4th Alpine rifle division, the 7th, 8th and 21st infantry divisions, the infantry guards division, a cavalry corps, and another infantry division whose name I do not recollect at present. Besides these, three German divisions selected from the 21 German divisions which were moving to Greece across Rumania, were sent to the USSR frontier ...

... On Marshal Antonescu's orders, the following were in addition, moved to the USSR frontier in May 1941: the frontier division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine rifle divisions, the 13th infantry division and an armoured division. Simultaneously with these divisions the Germans transferred to the USSR frontier seven German infantry divisions.

Thus, at the beginning of the Rumanian and German attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the Rumanian frontier with the USSR 12 Rumanian and 10 German divisions, totalling 600,000 men".

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The documents which have just been submitted to the Tribunal give grounds for stating that, on directions from the staff of the Fascist conspirators, Rumania's preparations for the aggression against the Soviet Union had begun long before they found their expression on paper in plan "Barbarossa."

Having attacked the Soviet Union, the Hitlerite lackeys expected gratitude from their masters for services rendered.

On the 27th July, 1941, Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing his gratitude to the latter and to his army.

I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler as USSR number 237.

Hitler writes (page 1 of the Russian translation of the letter, paragraph 3):

"Congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success--for me as great a pleasure as it is a satisfaction. The return of Bessarabia will be the best reward for you and your armies."

The promises of the Fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia.

I beg for permission to return to the conversation of the 12. 2. 1942, between Antonescu and Ribbentrop (document number USSR 233).

Page 4 of the Russian translation of this document (third paragraph from the top) contains the following entry.

"I reminded Herr Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by him in Berlin, he raised his glass to a Great Rumania, to which I replied that we entered into an alliance with the Axis in order to create a Great Rumania."

What then was this "Great Rumania" to represent, to which the Defendant Ribbentrop raised his glass?

This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as USSR number 242. This document is one of Antonescu's letters to Hitler, dated the 17th August, 1941. I will read paragraphs 2 and 4 of this document, which are on page 2 of the Russian translation.

"2. In compliance with the wish of your Excellency, I take upon myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there and for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary to delimit

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4. In order to secure order and to direct the economic exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the continuation of war, I consider it absolutely necessary that unity of command should be established.

I therefore beg your Excellency to give precise instructions defining my rights and my responsibility for the administration and economic exploitation of the territory between the rivers Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding of whole territory between the rivers of Dniester and Dnieper, for the maintenance of order there and for its security.

I beg you, your Excellency, to accept my best assurances from your devoted General Antonescu."

Two days after this letter had been written, Antonescu appointed a "Governor" of the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of "Tranistrian" regions.

I present to the Tribunal, as document USSR-295, the testimonial of this "Governor," Georges Alexianu, who was taken prisoner by the Red Army.

Alexianu, giving details on his nomination, testifies (page 2, paragraph 2, of the Russian text):

"Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance of the German army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which he offered to annex to Rumania the Soviet territories captured by the German troops and extending from the Dniester to the Dnieper, and to establish there their own occupation authorities."

At the end of the second and the beginning of the third page of the Russian text of the testimonial, Alexianu says that, in the summer of 1942, he was present at the meeting of the Rumanian Ministers' Council, at which:

"Marshal Antonescu, referring to the German and Rumanian military successes, stated, 'It is now evident how well I acted when, as early as November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the joint aggression against the Soviet Union."

However, the generosity of the Fascist Fuehrer, who gave Soviet territories away, right and left, to his vassals, noticeably diminished in the course of the war, as the Red Army successes grew.

In front of me lies Hitler's letter to Ion Antonescu, dated the 25th October, 1943, which I respectfully beg the Tribunal to accept as evidence under the number USSR-240. Something like two years and three months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Rumanian satrap on seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still been tormented by the question of organizing a unified administration in Zadniestrovye.

The circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now wrote:

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"My next request concerns the question of the utilization of Transistria, unhampered and unrestricted by any formal juridical or economic considerations - as the rear area for the Southern Army group and for Army Group "A" ... And further I ask you to put at the disposal of the German authorities the whole network of Transistrian railways".

As a very poor consolation Hitler added:

"All these measures have as their aim in the long run, to preserve Transistria for Rumania".

Then even Antonescu, who so many times subserviently assured Hitler of his faithfulness, could not endure.

On the 15th November 1943 he wrote a long reply to Hitler.

Without shame Antonescu wrote of how he accomplished the will of his Master for the sake of his country.

I present Antonescu's letter to Hitler as document number USSR-239.

His letter is dated: Bucharest, 14.11.1943.

I quote beginning with the second paragraph of the letter (the end of 6th page of the Russian text):

"As to the regime in the Transdnestrie we agree with your Excellency that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in minor details the problem of this territory as a military zone, a zone of supply etc.

I would like to begin by explaining the cause of my anxiety.

I do not know whether the truth about the Rumanian participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has always been told to you:

- that this war has cost Rumania 300 billions of leis;

- that during this period, we gave Germany more than 9 millions tons of oil, thus threatening our national stocks as well as the deposits themselves;

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-That we are incurring heavy expenses to support the families of 250,000 men who lost their lives in battle...

Of course the arrival of troops on the Transdnestrian territory is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Rumania.

Our only desire is that this take place in good order and be utilized in the most advantageous manner possible...

3. As regards the transfer of the Transdniestrian railways into German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation I beg your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this transfer is not indispensable.

Transdniestrian railways from 1941 to the present day worked well under the Rumanian administration; they always satisfied German demands and their management was always highly appreciated.

If the traffic capacity of Transdniestrian railways could not still be increased pursuant to the established plan we cannot bear any responsiblity for that. Here too we kept our obligations.

... I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the measures necessary in order to improve the railway transport and to increase the traffic capacity.

In as much as I personally was in charge of the organization of the administration and economics of this district it would have been for me a great vexation if the administration of the railways were to pass to the Germans as one could justly say that our incapacity in this respect was the reason of the measure."

There came a moment in the relations between the two aggressors when the former harmony, which had as its source the seizure of land and riches of other nations, - gave place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the greater financial responsability for the losses suffered as the result of the criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners.

This is evidenced by the following document, which I intend to submit to the Honorable Tribunal under the number USSR 245.

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The title of this document is "General Hansen's Meeting with Marshal Antonescu 7th July, 1943".

I shall read excerpts from this document (underlined in red pencil):

"General Hansen:

The change in the strategic situation in the Mediterranean and the preparations by the Anglo-Americans in Tunis and the Middle East, including the Island of Cyprus - the/ of three armies, reinforced by the/ Greeks and the Poles, compel Rumania to take stock of the situation which has arisen.

The air-raids on Athens and Salonica have proved the necessity for the dispersal of industrial concerns. The expenses necessary for carrying out the dispersal are a loss, but they may benefit Rumania even after the war.

Rumania is also obliged to spend 600,000,000 lei for the completion of the work of building up the night airforce.

Marshal Antonescu:

We began with a billion , then we were told two billion would be required, and now Mr. Klucksist speaks of yet another 6 - 7 billion.

... both verbally and in writing attention was drawn to the situatio which had arisen; we had lost about 200 billions on the Don and at Stalingrad; we had lost a lot, we had been compensated only in part, this chiefly on the Kuban and in the Crimea ...

...We have no treaties with Germany. At first they demanded that we enter the war. I said that we had to fight for Bessarabia and Bukovina. We were told that seven divisions would suffice. We entered the war, however, with 10 to 11 divisions. At the end of the battles for the Dniester, a third army was demanded of us (3 cavalry divisions, plus 3 Alpine rifle divisions). When it became clear that the enemy had large forces concentrated in the area of Odessa, it was suggested to us that we should send an army corps there.

This was still not enough. For the capture of Odessa, the whole army was mobilized. After the fall of Odessa, we were requested to send several more occupation divisions to the Ukraine... In the winter, new payments were demanded from me for the year 1942.

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The number of units was raised to 32. Then followed losses on the Don and in Stalingrad; I did not demand repayment for the losses, although Rumania felt the need for regrouping the army. One payment after another is demanded from us for the air force. We are not bargaining, but we cannot perform tasks which are beyond our possibilities.

General Hansen: (p. 4 - from the middle)

...The sum of 150 million marks is not considered too high in Germany.

Marshal Antonescu:

Compared with the country's budget, it appears very high...Our economy is in a state of decline. Germany has concentrated in her hands the whole of Europe's economy.

For the purpose of defence, every thing must be sacrificed, but I should like to define more accurately what represents Germany's share and what ours; when and with what war material we shall be paid.

General Hansen:

We have no lei.

Marshal Antonescu:

If you have no lei, give me at least armaments, equipment. The people must know what we receive instead of money.

General Hansen:

Even what is demanded by Germany is done in the interests of Rumania's defence. The rights are not defined. However, if we place all sorts of barriers in the way of beginning negotiations, we may suffer serious losses...

...We wanted to retain Tunis, but did not succeed. Everything is the result of this failure (p. 5, at the bottom).

Further on, General Hansen demands that the payments to the German Military Mission be increased from 525 million/per month to 650 millions.

Marshal Antonescu:

A new agreement is necessary. A treaty with the Finance Ministry. A basis is necessary...

I still suggest fixing export prices. I have been demanding this for two years...

General Hansen:

At the present moment this is impossible"...

Now I would like to pause briefly on several of the methods used by the Hitlerites in the sphere of foreign politics in their reciprocal relations with their own vassals.

I have in mind the line followed by the Hitlerite conspirators on the subject of Transylvania.

Holding out the Transylvanian question as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators managed to obtain subservience from their Hungarian and Runamian vassals.

I submit, as USSR Exhibit # 294, the deposition of Ruskizai-Rüdiger, formerly Colonel-General of the Hungarian Army.

Prior to May 1941 Ruskizai-Rüdiger held important posts in the Hungarian Foreign Ministry; subsequently but prior to September 1942, he commanded an army corps following which he became Deputy War Minister of Hungary.

Some time later I shall ask for a permission to take up this document in greater detail.

I shall now quote the deposition of Ruskizai-Rüdiger which refers to the Transylvanian question.

At the end of page 3 and the beginning of page 4 of the Russian text of the evidence Ruskizai-Rüdiger states:

" ... the second Vienna arbitration has assumed the form of a decision of little profit to Hungary. For Rumania there was reserved the district of Medvesh-Kasharmash where natural gas could be obtained. In the Hungarian political circles this was interpreted as Hitler's desire to insure himself an alliance with Rumania in the war with Soviet Russia. The fact that Hitler considered Rumania a more important ally than Hungary was explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet Union, Germany would most certainly need Rumania's southern wing which faces the Black Sea.

In an official conversation, approximately in November 1940, the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me on the subject the following:

" [illegible]

[illegible] But it [illegible]

" The second Vienna arbitration has aroused a bitter envy of Rumania in Hungary and it is up to us to obtain advantages from Hitler."

H5149 - 0039

I will remind you, that Antonescu says in his evidence submitted to the Tribunal, when speaking of his negotiations with Hitler:

"(in November 1941) Hitler told me that by the Vienna arbitration, the last word had not been spoken, thereby giving me to understand that Rumania could still count upon a revision of the solution previously adopted as regards Transylvania."

However, soon after, whilst visiting Budapest, defendant Ribbentrop, expressed an entirely opposite point of view.

I will present to the Tribunal three documents concerning the attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop and Goering, under these circumstances.

I will offer in evidence, document USSR-235, being the minutes of a subsequent conversations between Antonescu and Hitler, which took place on April 3-rd, 1942. I woll quote some excerpts from this document (page 3 of the Russian translation, paragraph 3 reading from the bottom of the page).

I quote:

"I, (Antonescu) reminded him (Hitler) that the Hungarian statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and in the press (after Ribbentrop's visit to Budapest) that should they intervene (i.e. should they send their troops) Transylvania would belong to Hungary; these rumours circulate, and they greatly demoralized the Rumanians. Hitler gave me his word of honor, that such promises had not been made and could not have been made, that this did not correspond to the actual facts.

In this way, Hitler juggled with promises to encourage the satellites.

The next document which I will submit to the honorable Tribunal is exhibit USSR-183, concerning the Transylvanian question and the defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of conversation which took place on February 10th 1942 between Antonescu and Von Doernberg, Chief of Protocol of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I will read this document:

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H5149 - 0041

"Von Doernberg introduced the subject of the order of "Charles I" which Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through various German Official channels in our country, as well as through the Rumanian offices accredited to the German Government...

...I told Herr von Doernberg that I would not be able to grant this award until Herr von Ribbentrop at the first opportunity would make a public declaration to Rumania (about the Transylvanian problem) which would bolster the faith of the Rumanian people, in its struggle for the cause of justice, and its legitimate claims in Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant him this award on condition that this would be made public only after such a declaration had been made by him.

Herr von Doernberg asked for time to consider the matter. Next day, before leaving the railroad car, he asked me to hand him this decoration, telling me that von Ribbentrop wanted it, and requesting me not to tell Ribbentrop about our conversation as he had promised / to make the award public only upon the fulfilment of my conditions. Upon this condition, I gave him the decoration, without however, handing him the corresponding certificate." And so Ribbentrop was ready to disclaim his Budapest statement on receipt of the Rumanian Order.

I have also at my disposal a record of a conversation between Antonescu and Goering. Unfortunately, this document, discovered together with other documents in Antonescu's personal archive, already mentioned by me, bears no date.

Submitting this record into evidence as exhibit USSR-238, I will quote but one excerpt:

1. During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Goering was very reticent to discuss the problem of Transylvania. On the way there, in a car, he said to the Marshal:

"After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania, which is essentially more German, than Rumanian or Hungarian."

On this occasion we may, presumably, admit that Goering has expressed the viewpoint of the Fascist Conspirators on the Transylvanian problem with a sufficient degree of truthfulness.

At present, with a view to concluding the clarification of Germany's mutual relations with her vassal, Rumania, I should like to pause on the subject of crude oil.

Now Rumania, in this field, was one of Germany's principal suppliers.

Even during the war the Hitlerites had pumped crude oil out of Rumania by all possible means. Antonescu refers to this in one of the letters that have already been quoted.

What the question meant to Germany and how significant it was considered by the Hitlerites themselves, is fully illustrated by the two documents which I shall now present.

I submit here, as USSR Exhibit # 224, an urgent telegram from the defendant Keitel, addressed to Marshal Antonescu and received by the latter on October 31, 1942.

Both this and the following documents are taken from the personal archives of Ion Antonescu, seized by the Red Army.

I quote this telegram: (Translation from the Rumanian)

" Received as # 177, this 31st October, 1942.

Urgent telegram transmitted via the German Mission.

To Marshal Antonescu.

Your Excellency,

In the name of the Fuehrer I approach Your Excellency with a reques for your personal intervention in the matter of accelerating the delivery of the maximum possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is essential to the latter for the conduct of their military operations in the Mediterranean.

Due to the absence of means of supply, the situation in North Africa has become extremely critical, and the transport both of military and food supplies depends entirely on the possession of the necessary quantity of fuel.

H5149 - 0042

I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum the supply of fuel to Italy. It is for the exclusive use of the fleet called upon to hold important positions in the Mediterranean.

I have chosen the path of the direct appeal to you because I am sure that your personal intervention will expedite the provision of the necessary help.

Devoted to you, Keitel, Fieldmarshal.

No.3986, 1942.

Tk 12

Allow me to the present to the Tribunal Antonescu's reply-wire to Keitel. This document I submit as USSR No.244-a.

I quote the text of this wire:

"Telegram to His Excellency, General Fieldmarshal Keitel.

Your telegram No.3986/42.

I beg you to inform the Fuehrer of the following:

1) Our delivery of the mineral oil is made on the basis of the allocation by the German authorities who set quotas for Italy, and no complaint have ever yet been made to our departments on account of delay in supplying mineral oil to the Italian Fleet.

2) The monthly quota of mineral oil for October was delivered almost in its entirety, although subsequent to Reichsminister Funk's visit, the quota was raised from 25,000 to 35,000 tons. We have enough transport left to move 1,500 tons of mineral oil, all of which will be re-transported across the border in the first five days of September.

3) Unfortunately we have no stocks of mineral oil in reserve and since the new borings did not produce the expected results, in spite of all efforts, our production shall, to a certain extent, fall back.

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4) In order to meet our obligations and simultaneously render all possible assistance to the common prosecution of the war, I should add that the mineral oil here supplied is mostly crude oil. As regards petroleum, I shipped in October also the 10,000 tons of the November quota.

5) The figures quoted above on the quantity of oil could only be obtained by the application of the strictest economy in its use within the country during October (11,000 tons).

If the winter cold is not too severe and if it will be possible to lay the oil pipe as far as Bucharest, we shall be able to reach new heights in production, which, without special requests, we shall place at your disposal. I beg you to transmit to the Fuehrer the expression of my sincere and devoted feelings of comradeship.

With expressions of particularly high esteem.

Marshal Antonescu

No.177/SS 31 October, 1942.

Let me remind you, Your Honors, that October and November 1942 were the months when Rommel's fate was being decided in North Africa and when the Red Army was barring the Germans' way to the Grozny and the Baku oil on the frontiers of Mozdok.

It was obvious that the Germans did not have sufficient crude oil.

I shall quote one part of the notes of the conversation between Antonescu and defendant Ribbentrop of 12 February, 1942, which has not yet been quoted.

The notes of this conversation have been previously submitted to the Tribunal as USSR Exhibit No.233.

On page 5 of the Russian text of this document there are the following lines.

In reply to Ribbentrop's mention of the crude oil question, Antonescu stated: "Regarding crude oil... Rumania contributed the maximum which it was in her power to contribute. She can do no more. The only way out of the situation will have to be the seizure of the territories rich in oil".

One should here note that Antonescu was not original in his desires for the seizure of territories rich in oil.

Antonescu was not being orginal when he expressed his opinion about the necessity of seizing territories rich in oil.

In the document from the personal office of the defendant Rosenberg, which I submit to the Tribunal as USSR 58, Rosenberg, in July 1941, formulated the German opinion on this subject as follows:

"Germany's interests consist in creating stable positions in the entire Caucasus, thus securing the safety of Continental Europe, i.e. securing for themselves the link with the Near East. It is only this link with the oil fields that can make Germany and all of Europe independent of any coalition of maritime powers in the future. The aim of German Policy is to control the Caucasus and the adjoining lands to the south, both politically and militarily."

(p.2 of the Russian translation. The text is underlined in red pencil).

On page 4 of the Russian text of this document [illegible], this idea is formulated with extreme clarity.

"The German Reich must take all petroleum into its hands."

I will now submit as evidence certain documents which characterize the mutual relations between the fascist conspirators and their other satellite - namely Finland.

Article 3 of the second variant of the Plan Barbarossa reads as follows:

"Finland will have to cover the advance of the German landing group "North" (units of the XXI group which is due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate jointly with that group. It will also be Finland's task to liquidate the (Russian) forces at Hangoe".

In the "Barbarossa time schedule" which was presented to the Tribunal by the American Prosecution as Exhibit C-39, the question of the participation of Finland in the war is mentioned in section 2, where, as I have mentioned already, it was stressed that:

H5149 - 0045

"Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General Staff have been under way since May 25th."

Further in article "B" of section 3, we read that:

"It is envisaged to transport from the Fatherland to Norway the 10th security division, 18 batteries of artillery and to transport to Finland 1 reinforced infantry division with army corps units. Out of these units, 1 infantry division, 2 mountain divisions and the SS combat group 'North' are designated for the case 'Silver Fox.'

"It is planned to bring by rail, through Sweden, another division for the attack on Hangoe, after the beginning of military operations."

I believe that it should be noted at once that the date of May 25th 1941, mentioned in the "Time Table Barbarossa" as that of the beginning of negotiations with the Finnish General Staff is incorrect.

The furnishing of this incorrect date was an attempt to conceal the true nature of this preparation for aggression, to present it under the guise of the preparation for so-called "preventive war."

Feb. 12

I now present to the Tribunal under number USSR-229 the deposition of the former Colonel of the German Army, Kitchmann.

Kitchmann held the office of military attaché in the German Embassy at Helsinki since October 1941.

On this subject he testifies as follows.

"A long time before the 22nd June, 1941, the German Government and the High Command of the German Armed Forces carried out secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General Staff of the Finnish Army and made joint preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union.

I learned about the preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union by the German and Finnish armies under the following circumstances: On my arrival at Helsinki in October, 1941 as deputy of the German military attache,

H5149 - 0046

I had numerous conversations with Major von Albedill who is aide to the German Military Attache and was formerly on duty in the Military Attache's Service in the General Staff of the German Army.

In place of Major-General Rossing the Military Attache who was seriously ill and receiving treatment at the Miron resort in Tyrol, von Albedill informed me of the situation in Finland and the direction of her military policy.

In the course of these converstions von Albedill told me that already in September 1940 Major-General Rossing, acting on an order of Hitler and the German General Staff, organized a visit of Major-General Talwel, the Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the Fuehrer's Headquarters in Berlin where he reached agreement with the German and the Finnish General Staffs concerning joint preparations for aggression and for war against the Soviet Union.

In this connection, I remember that in November 1941 when I visited General Talwell at his headquarters in Kunos i, he informed me, that already in September 1940, acting on Marshal Mannerheim's personal order, he established the first liaison with the German High Command on the subject of the joint preparation for the German and the Finnish attack on the Soviet Union".

The actual dates and circumstances connected with Finnish preparations for war with USSR are established by the statement of Buschenhagen, formerly Infantry General of the German Army, who on the authorization of the OKW, conducted negociations with the Finnish General Staff regarding joint operations against the Soviet Union.

I submit to the Tribunal this statement of Buschenhagen as # USSR-169 and demand that it be accepted as evidence.

I will read this statement:

H5149 - 0047

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"From the newspaper 'Izvestiz' of 20 December, 1945, I learned that during the trial of the war criminals in Finland, Finnish General Silasvuo announced that I, Buschenhagen, when a colonel in the German Army, visited Finland prior to the outbreak of the German-Soviet War.

As it is quite true that following the instructions of the German General Staff I visited Finland several times prior to the German attack on the USSR, I consider it necessary to relate here frankly and honestly the history of/Finland's participation in the German-Russian War.

1. At the end of December 1940 (about the 20th) being chief-of-staff of the German Forces in Norway with the rank of colonel, I was invited to a conference of the chiefs-of-staff of Armies in the OKH (High Command of the Army) in Zossen (near Berlin) which lasted several days and in the course of which the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder, presented the Plan Barbarossa, providing for an attack on the Soviet Union. During the same period the Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, General Heinrichs was in Zossen, conducting negotiations with Colonel-General Halder. Although I did not take part in these negotiations I assume that they were connected with the concerted German-Finish operations in the German war against the USSR. At the same time General Heinrichs gave a lecture to the senior German officers in OKH on the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939. In the lecture he praised highly the fighting qualities of the Finnish Army. After the Zossen Conference, Finnish Ambassador to Germany Kiwimyaki, gave a dinner in the Finnish Embassy on Von der Heydt Strasse in Berlin at which [illegible] General Heinrichs, Finnish Military Attache

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Colonel Kinzel of the " Foreign Armies East " Section of the OKH, myself, and several other senior officers of the OKW, (Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces) whose names I have forgotten, were present. The dinner passed in the atmosphere of friendship and the traditional German-Finnish brotherhood in arms.

In December 1940 or January 1941, I was negotiating in OKW with Generals Jodl and Warlimont regarding the possible collaboration between the German Forces in Norway and the Finnish Army at the outbreak of war against the USSR. The plan for an attack on the Murmansk area was then laid down.

2. In pursuance with these plans, in February 1941, I was instructed by OKH to proceed to Helsinki to negotiate with the Finnish General Staff, a plan for joint operations against the Soviet Union. In the middle of February 1941, together with Major Christian Muller of the General Staff, Chief of Department Iz (Intelligence) of the German Forces in Norway I went to in Helsinki via Stockholm. At the airport we were met by the Assistant German Military Attache who took us to the Hotel Societe Huset. The same evening I was received in the hotel by the Chief of the Finnish General Staff, General Heinrichs, who on behalf of his government, handed me a "Kontur" (Commander) Cross of the Finnish Order of the White Rose;

I was surprised to received this award before I had started my activities in Finland. Departmental Chiefs of the Finnish General Staff, Tapola, Melander, and others, as well as the German Military Attaché in Helsinki, Colonel Rossing were present at the reception.

During the subsequent two or three days, negotiations took place in the quarters of the Finnish General Staff, between myself, General Rossing, and Major Muller, on one side, and General Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and Chief-of-Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, on the other side. The question under discussion was the possibility of military operations from the northern and central parts of Finland in the direction of the White Sea and Murmansk. On the Finnish side a complete readiness to participate in the forthcoming German-Soviet war, was expressed. At the conclusion of the negotiations an 8-10 day reconnaissance tour took place.....Besides Major Muller and myself, Finnish Colonels Tapola and Wikla, as well as Assistant German Military Attache, also took part in this tour.

I was shown fortified sections of the frontier, roads, and possibilities of distributing troops for an attack on the Soviet Union were discussed. In Rovaniemi I met the Army Corps Commander, the Finnish General Silasvuo, who gave a dinner in my honor at the hotel "Podyanovi", on which occasion he made a speech on the Finnish-German comradeship-in-arms. During the final discussion at the Station hotel in Torneo, it was established on the basis of reconnoitering, that an offensive from the Kuusamo area in the direction of Kiestinki, and from the Kemijarvi area in the direction of Kandalaksha was the most suitable from the operational point of view, while that from the area of Petsamo in the direction of Murmansk would be subject to great difficulties. I suggested the necessity of further negotiations between the German and the Finnish General Staffs. Both the German and the Finnish participants of this reconnoitering were pledged to strict secrecy with regard to the subject of the negotiations and the results of the staff ride.

On my return to Oslo on 2 or 3 March 1941, I reviewed the data of the trip to Finland and they were submitted to the OKW in the form of an operational report by the Command of the German Forces in Norway. On the basis of this report was drawn up the operational plan "Blaufuchs" which provided for an attack on the Murmansk railroad from the areas of Kuusamo, Rovaniemi and Petsamo. The plan for the operations in the Kirkenes-Petsamo area was given the code name "Renntier" and the one for the Rovaniemi area the code name "Silberfuchs".

3. Towards the end of April or the beginning of May 1941 (I cannot now recall the exact date) after the OKW had studied and approved the operational plan suggested by the Command of the German Forces in Norway, I was sent again to Helsinki to continue negotiations between the German and the Finnish General Staffs. Together with me there flew to Helsinki via Koenigsberg the Chief of the OKH Section "Foreign Armies of the East, Colonel Kinzel. At the Helsinki airfield we were met by the German Military Attache Col.Ross and by a representative of the Finnish General Staff who accompanied us to the Hotel "Société Huset". The following day negotiations took place at the Headquarters of the Finnish General Staff with the Generals Heinrichs, Airo and Col.Napola, during which we established that the Finnish General Staff was fully prepared to take part in the forthcoming war with the Soviet Union.

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The leaders of the Finnish General Staff were apprehensive that Germany at the last moment might give up her agression against Russia, in which case Finland having carried out military preparations would be placed in a most difficult position. In spite of persistent demands of the Finnish General Staff officers, I was unable to give them the exact date for the beginning of war against the USSR.

The following subjects were discussed at this conference:

a) The necessary deadlines and concealment of mobilisation measures in Finland. The latter were to be carried out under the cloak of manoeuvres for reserve officers and men.

b) The offensive by the Finnish and the German forces.

The river Sulujoki was designated as the lateral boundary between the Finnish Troops under the command of Marshal Mannerheim and the German Troops under that of Gen. Falkenhorst. All Finnish units stationed north of that river were to be under the command of the Staff of the German Army Group in Norway.

c) The plan of the attack.

The execution of the combined offensive by the Finnish Troops and the German Army Group "North" against Leningrad, was to be strictly controled by the OKH (High Command of the German Army).

For Falkenhorst's Army the offensive was planned in the following directions:

from the Kuusamo Area on Kiestinki,

from the Kemijaervi Area through Salla on Kandalaksha, and from the Petsamo Area on Murmansk.

For the occupation of the Hangoe Island one German division was ear-marked. The Aland Islands were to be occupied by Finnish Troops.

An unanimous decision was reached with regard to all the subjects discussed at the Headquarters of the Finnish General Staff. Simultaneously Col. Kintzel reached agreement with Col. Melander, Chief of the Finnish Military Intelligence, regarding the exchange of information concerning the Red Army.

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With the Head of the Finnish Department of War Transportation, an agreement was reached regarding the use of Finnish transport facilities during the forthcoming war. On their side, the Finns made a request for arms and war material (guns, aircraft, tanks, munitions).

As far as I know, Marshal Mannerheim and the Minister of War , General Walden, were kept informed by General Heinrichs of the progress of our negotiations.

About the same time that I was in Helsinki there arrived the representatives of the German Air Force who negotiated with the Finns about the use their airfields and about the combined operations of Finnish and German air forces.

On the last day of the negotiations Colonel Kinzel and myself were received by Marshal Mannerheim at his villa. General Heinrichs and Mannerheim's aide-de-camp were also present. The Marshal expressed his satisfaction at the agreement reached by the German and the Finnish General Staffs, and said that the Germans and the Finns were bound together by old ties of friendship forged in battle.

On my return to Berlin I wrote the record of the agreement with the Finnish General Staff which I transmitted to the OKW and OKH.

4. In May 1941 Chief of the Finnish General Staff, General Heinrichs, was invited to Hitler's Headquarters at Berchtesgaden. I was also summoned there. I met General Heinrichs, accompanied by Colonel Tapola and an adjutant at the Brandenburg airfield. Together with him and the Chief of the OKW Foreign Section, Captain Buerkner, I flew to Munich and proceeded from there by car to Salzburg. General Heinrichs was not received by Hitler. The final negotiations for the participation of Finland in the forthcoming war with the USSR took place at Salzburg in a hotel near the station. Finland was represented at this conference by General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, while Fieldmarshall Keitel, General Jodl, General Warlimont/and Captain Buerkner myself represented Germany. On the basis of the previous negotiations between the German and the Finnish General/Staffs, a final plan was drawn up for combined military operations, deadlines were set for mobilisation and the date fixed for the start of the offensive.

At the conclusion of this conference a dinner was held in the special train of the High Command at Salzburg.

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After this I left with General Heinrichs for Berlin where at the Ordnance Department an agreement was reached concerning German deliveries of war material.

5. On 12 or 13 June 1941, when German elements were enroute to Finland, Erfurt, a German Colonel-General, newly appointed liaison officer with the Finnish General Staff, his chief-of-staff Lieutenant-Colonel Boelter and myself, flew from Berlin via Koenigsberg to Helsinki. There we were met by the German Military Attaché and the Finnish Colonel Wilamo, who took us to our hotel.

We saw General Heinrichs the next day at the Headquarters of the Finnish General Staff. I presented to him a written account of the previously outlined combined measures to which he gave his approval after making one minor of change. On the same occasion I transferred my duties to General Erfurt, my duties as liaison officer [illegible] with the Finnish General Staff. As far as I can remember, general secret mobilization began in Finland the same day.

The next day I flew from Helsinki to Rovaniemi to direct the offensive of the German-Finnish troops of Falkenhorst's Army Group. Liaison officers of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Vilamo and Major Aahonen also arrived there.

Concluding, I wish to emphasize the fact that no pressure was put on the Finnish General Staff by the German High Command and the German General Staff, as the former from the very beginning showed great readiness to participate with Germany in the war against the U.S.S.R. and voluntarily accepted all our proposals.

I hereby declare that with the exception of a few single dates about which I may have been in error, the whole of the above statement is true and correct.

To these facts I am ready to testify in court and assent to the publication of this statement for the sake of historical truth.

Buschenhagen, -
formerly General of Infantry
in the German Army."

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3. Buschenhagen was interrogated by the Chief prosecutor for the USSR, as Paulus was, and in the course of interrogation fully confirmed his statement.

Buschenhagen's statement disposes of all attempts to assert that the war waged by Finland was a separate war and was dissociated from the war aims of fascist Germany. Finland's entry into the war had been envisaged by the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded with the aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers.

The Finns, like the other satellites of Germany, waged war in order to acquire entire regions and republics of the Soviet Union.

Hitler spoke at the conference of 16 July 1941 (USA exhibit L-221) of the Finnish claims to Eastern Carelia and the Leningrad region.

Rumania and Finland were the two German satellites directly mentioned in case "Barbarossa".

The part these countries played in the plans of German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their war-potential (which without doubt bore its proper weight) but also by their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the Soviet Union.

The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for aggression against the USSR was carefully concealed by the fascist conspirators, just as all the preparations in connection with case Barbarossa were.

The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in plan Barbarossa.

However this cannot be taken to mean that the participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had not been planned by the fascist conspirators.

My colleague, Colonel Pokrovski, submitted under USSR-182, the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Roudenko.

In this deposition Paulus deals in detail with the Hungarian question (page 1 of the Russian text).

"The complete acceptance of Germany's leading part on the side of Hungary," Paulus deposes, "determined her policy, which furthermore was brought about by two main factors: (1) the desire for territorial conquests with German help, and 2) the fear of the increasing strength of Rumania as Germany's military ally. Special stress was laid on this fact by the close upper circle of the OKW and OKH.

"From this view-point Hitler considered that Hungary was in line with German policy."

Actually Hitler's policy with regard to Hungary differed but little from the policies he adopted toward his other vassals.

Paulus states that in disclosing his plans Hitler was considerably more reticent with regard to Hungary than with his other satellites, as he thought the Hungarians talkative.

However, Paulus adds immediately (page 2 of the same document):

"The real reason was Hitler's unwillingness to allow the Hungarians to seize the oil regions of Drogobych.

Subsequently, with the beginning of aggressive operations against the USSR, the OKH ordered the 17th Army to seize Drogobych before the arrival of the Hungarians."

Further, on page 2 of the Russian text of the deposition, Paulus discloses the scope of the organizational questions discussed by the German and the Hungarian General Staffs.

"Already in December 1940 steps were taken by the German and the Hungarian General Staffs for the reorganization and the rearmament of the Hungarian Army in the light of the general conception of "Barbarossa."

Beginning with December 1940 various Military Missions from Hungary began to arrive in Berlin including also the Hungarian Minister of Defense, General von Barta, to commence discussions with the German authorities concerned.

H5149 - 0055

3.

The problems of the deliveries by Germany of war materials (tanks, aircraft, etc.) were being solved.

Personally I was concerned with questions relating to the reorganization of the army.

Together with Major-General BUHLE, Chief of the Organization Section of the OKH General Staff, I held consultations with Colonel LASZLO, Chief of the Operations Section of the Hungarian General Staff, who arrived in Berlin in December 1940.

The consultations concerned the reorganization of brigades into divisions and the activation of mechanized and tank units.

It was apparent to both us, the German officers, and the Hungarian officers, that the basis of these military preparations must be the military collaboration between Germany and Hungary.

The Hungarians clearly understood that Germany's assistance was a timely and well considered preparation of the Hungarian army for future combined operations, hence enlisting an ally.

If it please Your Honours, Von Paulus' deposition, somewhat lifts the veil which shrouds the mutual relationship between the German and the Hungarian aggressors.

In this connection I consider it necessary to take up again the deposition by RUSZKICIAY-RUEDIGER which is already before the Tribunal.

H5149 – 0056

H5149 - 0057

Dealing with the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary in 1939, Ruszkiciay-Ruediger deposed (page 2, paragraph 3 from bottom):

"...This had taken place...not long before the outbreak of the German-Polish war. It seemed then as if economic advantages and the escape from the restrictions of the Trianon Treaty were for Hungary the objectives of the occupations.

"But from the time when the region of Carpatho-Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia...this region which we had occupied began to take on a different significance for us.

It was clear to us, the higher officers, that the political leadership of both Germany and Hungary considered this region also strategically important for future military operations against Soviet Russia."

On page 9 (par. 2 from the bottom) Ruszkiciay-Ruediger tells us of a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of which the Hungarian Minister of War, Warta, outlined the objectives for the war with Yugoslavia. Among other objectives Warta blankly pointed to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a probably ally of the Soviet Union.

However a more complete picture of the German-Hungarian relationship, which intended the preparation of an attack on the Soviet Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major-General Stephen Ujszaszy.

From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942, Ujszaszy was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Hungarian General Staff. In his official capacity during these years he had inside information of the secrecy which shrouded this preparation.

Some of the things which he knows he told us in the document which I offer in evidence as exhibit USSR-155.

I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy's statement which may clarify the question at issue. (Beginning from page 2 of the Russian Text.)

"In November 1940, the German Military Attaché in Budapest, Colonel Guenther KRAPPE of the German General Staff, was received in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, Colonel-General Henry Wert Krappe came with a letter from the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, Colonel-General Halder.

In that letter Halder informed Wert that in the spring of 1941, Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, by force if necessary, to adopt a definite position in order to forestall at a later date, the threat of a Russian attack from the rear.

In this preventive war, possible against Yugoslavia, and certain against Russia, Hungary will have to take part in her own interests.

Wert replied that he agreed with Halder but added that the Hungarian army was insufficiently armed and at that moment was not ready for war against Soviet Russia. Simultaneously, he asked Germany to supplement Hungary's armaments.

Regarding Halder's letter and this answer I was informed by Colonel-General Wert.

After that, a Hungarian armament commission was invited to go to Berlin. It consisted of leading expert officers from the Ordnance Department of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defence (Honved) and left for Berlin in December 1940.

The Hungarian requests were as follows:

Delivery of 10-centimeter field howitzers (the so-called "Goering's) which Hungary did not possess.

Modern tanks and armoured cars for two mechanized brigades.

Fighter planes "Messerschmidt - 109"

The Germans promised a partial fulfilment of these requests.

I learned about the armament commission's visit to Germany through official channels, owing to the position I then held.

In December 1940, the Chief-of-Staff of the OKW, Fieldmarshal Wilhelm KEITEL, invited the Hungarian Minister of Defence (HONVED), Colonel-General Carl Barta, to come to Berlin in order

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a) to discuss personally the problem of armament;

b) to elaborate a plan of military and political collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of 1941.

This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal Hungarian military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Alexander Homlok of the General Staff.

At the same time, I received a similar invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign Section of the "Abwehr" of the OKW. I omit Ujseascy's long list of the persons who accompanied Barth on his trip and read further - on page 4, line 7 from the top:

"... an agreement was reached on the following:

... In the spring of 1941, the position of Yugoslavia will become clear, the threat of an attack by Soviet forces from the rear will be removed For this purpose, the Hungarian Honved army will be supplied with 10 centimeter field howitzers, modern tanks and armoured cars for equipping one mechanized brigade.

For the war against Russia, Hungary must put at Germany's disposal 15 strategic units (including 3 mechanized, one cavalry and one tank units); she must also complete by 1 June, 1941 the erection of fortifications in Carpatho-Russia, assist the advance of the German Troops in the areas adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers and secure the bringing up of supplies through Hungary. The details for the preparation of operations will be worked out later by representatives of the German General Staff to be sent to Hungary.

As a political compensation for her participation in the war, Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Russia (the ancient princedom of Galitz, and the foothills of the Carpathian mountains as far as the river Dniestr)",

In March 1941 Eberhard Kinzel, a Colonel of the German General Staff, visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final arrangements for the attack on Yugoslavia.

This is what Ujszaszy has to say in this connection (page 5 of the Russian text, 3rd paragraph from the bottom):

"In March 1941, Colonel Kintzel arrived in Budapest bringing with him a letter from Colonel-General Halder to Colonel General Wert.

In this letter there was an insistent demand by Germany that Hungary was to participate in the probable war against Yugoslavia by the mobilization of the following army corps: I - Budapest, II - Ssekesfehervar, III - Sssombathely, IV - Pecs, V - Sseged, and in the war against Soviet Russia by the mobilization of 15 strategic units, including two cavalry divisions, two mechanized brigades, and one infantry brigade.

The letter also announced of the imminent arrival in Budapest of the German General Staff mission headed by Lt-General Paulus which was to discuss the combined operations and the movement of the German troops to Yugoslavia through Hungary.

Replying to this letter, Colonel-General Wert invited the German mission to Budapest, promised consent to the participation of Hungary in the war against Yugoslavia, and the availability for this purpose of three army corps: I, IV and V. Concerning war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in priciple, promising at the least to mobilize the VIII Army Corps (Kopitze) as well as the mechanized operational units demanded by Halder.

Regarding this correspondence I was informed by the Cololnel of the German General Staff Kinzel personally.

It war during Paulus' visit to Budapest that a definite decision was made as to what units of the Hungarian army would participate in the attack on Yugoslavia and on the Soviet Union.

Touching on this question, UJSASCI writes that, as agreed during the negotiations with Paulus (page 6, paragraph 3 from the top):

"The Hungarian Hoved army is to participate in the operations against Yugoslavia by contributing the Army Corps I, IV and V, one cavalry division, and one mechanized brigade. The main forces are to be used in the region lying between the Danube and the Tissa.

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"With the main effort planned against Zagreb, two German Army Corps will be concentrated in the South-Western part of Hungary. The Second Section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff is to place at the disposal of the Germans all the statistical data (files) on Yugoslavia which are in its possession; to accept the responsibility for intelligence through secret agents in Bachka and Banat; and to establish continuous radio communications with the Command of the German forces concentrated on Yugoslavia's borders for exchange of information.

Hungary is to participate in the operations against the Soviet Union, with at least 6 strategic units (including 3 mechanized) in the area of Carpathian Ukraine and not later than 1 June 1941 to finish there the construction of fortifications. The operations of the Hungarian Armed Forces will be carried out in coordination with the operations of the German Army."

The subsequent events, according to Ujszaszi, developed in the following manner (p. 7, par. 4 from the bottom):

"At the end of April 1941, the German Military Attache in Budapest, Colonel of the General Staff , Gunther Krappe, was replaced by the Colonel of the General Staff, Rudolph Tussen, who arrived from Belgrade.

Prior to his departure for Budapest, Tussen was received by Hitler. The basic directive, given to Tussen by Hitler, was to spur Hungary toward active participation in the war against the Soviet Union. Hitler commissioned him to promise Hungary once more the province of Eastern Galicia (including the oil wells of Drogobich).

The same commission was simultaneously given by Reichsmarshal Goering to the German air attache in Budapest, Lt. Gen. Futterer.

As a result of Futterer's and Tussen's endeavors, and with the consent of the Regent, toward the end of May 1941, Colonel-General Wert ordered the formation of the so-called "Carpathian Group".

The composition of the Carpathian Group was as follows:

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12th Infantry Division in Ujgorod

1st Mountain Infantry Brigade

Border battalions of the VIII. Army Corps

1st Cavalry Division

1st Mechanized Brigade

2nd Mechanized Brigade

Regarding methods of the preparation for war used by the fascist clique in Hungary, there is the testimony of the Ujzaszi's statement (middle of p. 8 of the Russian text):

".....Maj-Gen. Laszlo, as the chief of the Operational Group and my immediate superior, ordered the second Section of the General Staff to prepare a report that would confirm the presence on the Hungarian border of 14 Soviet operational units, including eight motorised. This report was prepared by Col. Cornell Aidai of the Personnel Unit.

I want here to note the fact that the intelligence operations of the second Section of the Royal Hungarian General Staff, established the presence on the Hungarian border actually of only 4 Soviet operational units. This circumstance I duly and factually reported to Colonel General Wert and Major-General Laszlo, but the latter ordered my truthful and factual report to be altered to get what he desired."

Ujzaszi's further relates the provocative plans of the militarist clique in Hungary, the fulfilment of which involved the creation of an incident for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Ujzaszi states (p.10, line 4 from the top):

"These plans emanated from Lt.-General Fuetterer, his assistant Col. Frimond, and Major-General Laszlo. They proposed that, if necessary, the German planes, camouflaged as Russian, would bombard the eastern border districts of Hungary with bombs of Russian origin." And finally Ujzaszi describes the last days preceding the attack on the Soviet Union. (p.II, par. 2):

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"In the first half of June 1941, (I believe, between the 8th and the 12th,) the Chief of Staff of the OKH, Colonel-General Halder, when on his way from Rumania, stopped at Budapest at the Budapest-Matiasfeld military airport. There he spent 3 hours.

He was received by Colonel-General Wert. Halder inspected the German and the Rumanian troops then concentrated in Southern Rumania for a war against Soviet Russia. He used the opportunity of being in Budapest to discuss with Wert the general plan for starting the operations, I here learnt the following from Major-General Laszlo:

The German units, concentrated east of Cracow were to advance first and move toward Lwow; then the Rumanian and the German troops were to advance across the Dniestr in the north-easterly direction. Simultaneously, the Hungarian units kept ready for action behind the Carpathians, were to tie up and to draw in their direction the largest possible Russian forces and only later was the strong southern flank to advance through Kolomy-Gorodenki...

...The concentration of the Hungarian "Carpathian Group" on the Russian border was accomplished by 20 June, 1941, and on 21 June, 1941, the Russian-German war broke out.

As far as I remember it was at 12.30 noon, 24 June, 1941, when I was informed that the Soviet planes were bombing Raho in Carpathian Russia and with machine-guns strafing trains in its vicinity. That same day, after midday, the news came in that Soviet aircraft were bombing Koschitze. The Crown Council, the Regent presiding, met the same evening and "on the basis of Soviet Russia's provocation" decided to declare war on that country.

I am convinced that those were German planes with Russian markings. My conclusions are based on the following:

a) Lt.Gen. Fuetterer and the German propaganda publicised this bombing too widely and too much;

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b) Major-General Laszloimmediately gave me the order through propaganda Sub-section of Section 2 of the Royal Hungarian General Staff to get photographs of the found fragments of the "Soviet Bombs", and to publish them in the press of the fascist countries.

c) Lt.General Fuetterer, Major-General Laszlo, and Lt.Colonel Arimond spread by a "whispering campaign", the rumor that Slovakian pilots who are in the Russian service bombed Kosice (Kaschan) and successful hits must be explained by the fact that these pilots knew the terrain well.

In the deposition of Ruskiscai Rüdiger submitted bo the Tribunal there are given reasons for Hungary's attack on the Soviet Union. Although Ruskiscai Rüdiger's viewpoint on the subject may not be universal, as testimony of the Hungarian Deputy War Minister it still is of considerable interest. On page 10 of the Russian text of his deposition, he states that approximately toward the end of May 1941, he received the order to give priority to supplies for the troops in the Carpathian Ukraine. And two days later at the quarters of Colonel-General Wert, Chief of the General Staff, there took place a secret meeting of the corps commanders during which a forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was announced.

Ruskiscai Rüdiger writes:

"General Wert (Chief of the General Staff) briefed us on the military and political situation.....it appears that in the forthcoming attack of Germany against the Soviet Union, Rumania and Hungary . . will take active part on the side of Germany....."

Ruskiscai Rüdiger further points out that:

".....The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of Ministers after Premier Bardoshy and Minister Barta made their reports, and was ratified by the Crown Council. The question was not submitted to Parliament. The decision...did not produce any surprise as it was the result of thevoluntary military collaboration with Germany which had actually existed for many years.

"The Hungarian General Staff and the political leadership of Hungary, beginning with the aggression against Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as the mainstay in their plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation on Trans-Carpathian Ukraine and the strategic organization of this region as a military base for an attack on Soviet Russia.

"After the annexation of Northern Transylvania, Hungary, guided by jealousy towards Rumania and by fears of receiving a smaller share than Rumania, was ready to do her utmost to please Germany. The last step was the collaboration in the elimination of Yougoslavia as a possible ally of Soviet Russia.

In his report Ujzaszi mentioned the German military attache in Hungary, Krappe.

The former Lieutenant-General of the German Army, Gunther Krappe, was the German military attaché in Budapest from November 1939 till 30th April 1941.

After that, Krappe was in command of the X Corps of "SS" troops of the Army Group "Visla", and was taken prisoner.

I beg the Tribunal to accept as evidence the statement made by Krappe in January of this year. This document is filed under # USSR-150. The main circumstances mentioned in Krappe's statement coincide with those in Ujzaszi's report.

I shall read a few excerpts from Krappe's document:

" In October 1940, I was ordered by the OKH to report on the conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia (Carpathian Ukraine). The Chief of the Operations Section, Colonel Laszlo, reported to me that so far there were only simple anti-tank obstacles, placed from 1 to 2 kilometres in depth, and that the construction of the barracks for quartering troops had just begun. The necessary surveys for the construction of reinforced concrete pillboxes (DOT) along the border and the highways would be made during the winter, and in the spring of 1941 it would be possible to start the actual construction. But first of all funds must he appropriated for this construction. It appeared to be a matter of some 6,000,000 pengo.

General Wert gave me permission for an automobile trip through Mukachevo to Ujoksky Pass.

The results of the inspection trip and the information

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obtained from Colonel Laszlo, were communicated by me to Berlin. Sometime later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the building of these fortifications had been appropriated.

During this same month, von Erdmansdorf, the German Ambassador, informed me about the forthcoming movements of the German training detachments across Hungary and Rumania, which were requested by Antonescu from Hitler. The permission for the transit of these troops had apparently been already given by the Hungarian Government.

In this connection I was to receive the permission from the Hungarian War Minister von Barta for the transfer from Vienna to Budapest of a Communications Officer. This permission was granted and the officer, who was as far as I recall, Lieutenant Colonel von Diringshausen occupied a building on Andrani street together with his staff. While on duty, he wore German uniform and was subordinated directly to the Chief of German War Communications, General Gerke. The Hungarian General Staff assigned to him a liaison officer, I believe named Major Kerr. The latter handed the echelons arriving from Germany over to the Administration of the Hungarian railroads.

Simultaneously, I obtained without any difficulties the permission of General von Barta for the [illegible] to be present German soldiers and officers in military uniform on Hungarian territory. On this occasion, General Barth told me that he was granting this permission, although public opinion would not approve of it.

As I was already convinced, these echelons were regular troops designated for large-scale operations, from the month of December on.

In order to raise the combat efficiency of the Hungarian Army as directed by OKH, I requested the assignment of five officers to various branches of Hungarian Army, for the purpose of exchanging experience and for training.

... Beginning with December 1940, the Hungarian industry was converted to enlarge the German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of Armament Department, was in charge.

With the assent of the Hungarian General Staff we established in Hungary a communication system for military needs, in conjunction with the Postal Administration."

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In concluding the presentation of documents concerning the building up by the fascist war-criminals of an aggressive bloc against the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general order, deriving from these documents.

The actual measures on the part of the fascist conspirators for the inclusion of Rumania, Finland and Hungary in the preparations for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union, began in September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Rumania.

The negotiations accompanying military preparations for aggression against the USSR in each of these countries, proceeded without difficulties and were in substance concluded during the period September - December 1940. The negotiations were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite armies. The subjects of the negotiations in each case were matters of a purely military character such as the reconditioning of the troops, the transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans, deciding on the number of divisions i/ needed to attack the USSR, etc.

The character of the talk testifies to the fact that there existed between the Fascist Government of Germany and the governments of Rumania, Finland and Hungary, a mutual consent with regard to aggression against the Soviet Union long before the actual attack.

And finally, the documents submitted establish that each of these countries in one way or another was promised by the fascist conspirators some territory of the Soviet Union.

I would now like to point out one circumstance.

In order to grasp fully the consequences of the predatory fascist attack on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to stop at the plan "Barbarossa".

For that is a strategic plan. A plan for a military attack. A plan for commencing aggression.

As is i/ wll known the attack was followed by the so-called "assimilation" and "organisation" of the occupied territories. The plans for the "assimilation" and "organisation" which were plans for the destruction of the civilian population and the plundering of the

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occupied districts of the Soviet Union, were also made in advance just like the plan "Barbarossa".

The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents in the possession of the Tribunal and specifcally such documents as the "Directives for Special Areas" of 13 March, 1941 (U.S.Exhibit 447-PS), signed by the Defendant Keitel; "Order for the Application of Military jurisdiction and procedure in area Barbarossa" (U.S.Exhibit C-50) also signed by Keitel "Propaganda Directive for Plan "Barbarossa" U.S.Exhibit C-26) and others, represent destruction of all the not only legal but also moral standards of conduct of the fascist usurper hordes on temporarily occupied Soviet territories, this destruction having been premeditated and planned long prior to the attack on the Soviet Union.

Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites decided and outlined in the appropiate paragraphs of these instructions, directions and orders, the methods of dealing with the civilian population, the orders and means for plundering the Soviet land and reducing it to a colonial region of the "Third Reich".

And when the war broke out, and the secret became obvious, the fascists felt no embarrassment in transferring all these problems to the pages of their press.

I submit to the Tribunal as USSR-Exhibit 59, an article published 20 August, 1942, in "Das Schwarze Korp", an "SS paper and organ of the "Reichsfuehrer" of the "SS"-

It was openly written in this article, entitled "Should They Be Germanised?"

" The Reichsfuehrer of the SS chose the following slogan for one of the editions of the newspaper "Deutsche Arbeit", devoted to the problems of resettlement in the East.

"Our objective is not Germanisation in the old sense of the term i.e. imposing upon the population the German language and the German laws but to ensure that only people of really German blood inhabit the East."

This negation of Germanisation is not new. However, expressed by the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, acting as State Minister for the strengthening of the German nation, it becomes and order. Such is the exact meaning of these words.'

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The refusal to Germanise the populations of occupied territories "and the assertion that "The East should only be inhabited by people of really German blood", signified in practice the mass annihilation of Soviet citizens, their deportation to slave-labor, the destruction of centuries' (Millenary?) old Russian culture, and of our cites and villages. I shall confine myself to that which has already been stated as this theme, or rather these several themes, have been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues.

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On June 22, 1941, after lengthy preparations, the German-fascist hordes crashed on the Soviet Union. 170 divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, began the invasion.

The military problems of the attack were formulated in the plan "Barbarossa.

"The German armed forces should be ready for a defeat of Russia by means of a fast-flowing operation even prior to the end of the war with England...

To this end the army will have to utilize all units at its disposal except those which will have to guard the occupied territories against unexpected developments."

Another version of "Barbarossa" foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, to forestall the possibility of the speedy retreat inland of its fighting units, and to provide the German Fascist invaders with the possibility to reach speedily a line of combat which would put the German regions out of the range of the soviet air force.

As in ultimate aim, the war plan of "Barbarossa" provided for the strengthening of Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction from the air of the Ural industry, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and as a decisive finale, the capture of Moscow.

The political aims which determined the military plans, have been formulated by the Hitlerites in the many documents quoted in this room. But these aims were stated particularly clearly and cynically at a meeting in Hitler's appartment on 16 July, 1941, (Document of the American Prosecution, No. L-221), when Hitler, Goering, Rosenberg, Keitel and other fascist conspirators, were deciding, as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.

Together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine and the Baltic , Crimea, the Bielostok Forests, and the Kola Peninsula, were to "join" Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Rumania while Finland acquired Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad District.

As is well known, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent their real, piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting at General Headquarters on the 16. 7. 41 (document L-221 of the American prosecution), for instance, Hitler said that it was important not to reveal their aims to the whole world, not to complicate their path by unnecessary

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declarations and, in giving reasons for their actions, to start from tactical intentions. (p.1 of the Russian text of the document).

The defendant Rosenberg stated on the 20th June 1941, at a conference regarding the Eastern question (the American document 1058-PS), that tactics were very important and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arise, when one or the other slogan could be given publicity (p. 15 of the Russian text of the document).

Taking this circumstance into consideration, my lords, it appears of value for our investigation to turn to some statements by the fascist war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible to "publish some of their political aims".

In 1941-42, the fascist hordes broke into territories of the Soviet Union, and got right up to Moscow, and fighting took place on the banks of the Volga.

The of a "Great Germany", ruling the world, Hitlerite conspirators. That very opportunity arrived, about which the defendant Rosenberg had spoken, when "certain political slogans could be made public".

I present to the Tribunal, under No. USSR 58, a document from the archives of the defendant Rosenberg's office, relating to questions of German policy in the occupied regions of the Caucasus.

is how the Eastern Problem was solved on the 27th July 1942 in this document.

"The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely conceived military frontiers for Germany. The task of the Ukraine consists in securing Germany' and Europes food supply and the continent's supply of raw materials.

The task of the Caucasus is primarily a political task and means the expansion of Continental Europe, under German leadership, from the Caucasin isthmus to the Near East" (p. 9 of the Russian translation; the text is underlined in red pencil).

On the 27th November 1941, the defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the international situation. The text of this report was published in No. 329a of the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt" of the 27th November 1941.

Ribbentrop said:

"I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of Soviet Russia and of the occupation of the greater part of European Russia in 1941, as follows:

1. With regard to the war, England's last ally on the continent has thereby ceased to be a significant factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become unassailable in Europe. Besides this, colossal forces have become free for other purposes.

2. In the economic field, the Axis powers, together with their friends, and, at the same time, the whole of Europe, have achieved independence from countries overseas. Europe has once for all been fried from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw materials of Russia in Europe can fully cover the needs of Europe. Its war production will serve Germany's war economy and that of her allies, as a result of which Europe's war potential will increase still more. The organization of this vast area is already in full swing. Thus, two desisive prerequisites for the victory of the Axis and its allies over England have been created."

I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same subject. It is Gobbels' speech in Munich, published on the 19.10.42 in the main organ of the Nazi party, the "Voelkischer Beobachter"(South German edition)

The text of this speech is presented to the [illegible] Tribunal under the No. USSR 250.

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Goebbels said:

"...We have captured the most important grain-producing, coal-mining, and metallurgical regions of the Soviet Union. We today possess what the enemy has lost. And since what the enemy is short of has come to us, it is of double value. In the past we were a people without space, but today this is not any longer the case. Today we have only to shape this space which our soldiers have conquered, to make it useful to us, and this requires a definite period of time. But if the British contend that we have lost the war because we have lost time, this contention only shows how completely they fail to understand the situation. Time works only against those who have no space and raw materials. If we make use of time to organize the space conquered, it will work not against us, but for us..."

(p. 2 the text is underlined in red pencil.)

That which Ribbentrop and Goebbels said about exploiting the space captured by the soldiers, took on, at the OKW, the shape of plans for further aggression.

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In this respect the following document which I now submit to the Tribunal under No. 57 appears interesting. This document is a letter from the German Naval War Staff to the commanding Generals of Groups "West", "North" and "South". It was discovered by the allied troops in one of the captured archives.

This letter describes its subject as "Objectives for the further conduct of War upon termination of the campaign in the East", and is dated 8 August 1941.

In those days the fascist conspirators considered the victory over the Soviet Union to be only a question of time, and therefore planned for further aggression.

This letter which I am about to quote begins with the following words (paragraph 1 of the letter):

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"The Naval War Staff has just received the draft of the Fuehrer's directives concerning further intentions on termination of the campaign in the East.

The following propositions give a general outline of these intentions and are intended for the personal information of the Commanding Generals and their Chiefs of Staff."

There follows paragraph P, the 8 sub-paragraphs of which detail the plans to be carried out on the termination of the campaign in the East.

I omit two sub-paragraphs which deal with the tasks of the so-called "pacification" of the occupied Eastern territories and with the assignment to other fronts of troops which had become available.

Sub-paragraph 3 details the intentions of the fascist conspirators in North Africa. I quote:

"Sufficient strengthening of armed forces in North Africa to make the capture of Tobruk possible. In order to permit the passage of necessary transports, attacks by the German air force on Malta must be resumed.

Provided the weather conditions do not cause delay and the shuttle service of transports is assured, it can be counted on that the campaign against Tobruk will begin as from the middle of September."

In August 1941 the Hitlerites intended with the aid of Spain to seize Gibraltar during the same year.

Sub-paragraph 4 of Paragraph P of the same letter envisaged that:

"Plan 'Felix', i.e. the seizure of Gibraltar must be executed still in 1941 with the aid of Spain".

The Hitlerites planned the execution of an attack against Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt. Sub-paragraph 5 of the said paragraph states as follows:

"If, after the obvious termination of the campaign in the East, we succeed in bringing Turkey to our side, an attack on Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt is foreseen after a minimum preparation of necessary forces lasting 85 days, and the preliminary securing of the Caucasian passes and the improvement

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of transportation conditions in Anatolia, Turkey, with German help".

Two sub-paragraphs later we find in sub-paragraph. 8 the follwing possible version of this plan:

"If even after the defeat of Soviet Russia, Turkey should not side with us, an attack through Anatolia in a southerly direction will be carried out against her will".

In the plans of fascist aggression Egypt played a large part. It is mentioned in sub-paragraphs 6 & 7 of paragraph P of the quoted letter.

Sub-paragraph 6 projected:

"An attack on Egypt from Cyrenaica (after the fall of Tobruk). Presumably this attack cannot be carried out before the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942".

Sub-paragraph 7 stated that:

"If the collapse of the Soviet Russia creates the necessary conditions, an advance by/ /a motorized expediationary force through Trans-Caucasia in the direction Persian Gulf - Iran - Syria - Egypt is envisaged.

Because of weather conditions this attack will become possible only at the beginning of 1942."

This document, which I have just presented to the Tribunal, shows the turn of events intended by the fascist conspirators, should the Red Army not have stopped their aggression.

The fascist aggressors intended to destroy the Soviet Union, to seize her wealth, to subjugate the Soviet people and by these means to open for themselves the road to world domination.

I have now come to the end of my task.

In concluding the presentation of documentary evidence regarding the aggression of the fascist conspirators against the Soviet Union, may I ask the Tribunal's permission to sum up briefly as follows:

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1. The criminal intent of attacking the USSR for the purpose of plundering the Soviet Union and exploiting its riches for purposes of further German aggression, was conceived by the fascist conspirators long before the actual launching of the attack.

2. The military preparations proper for the attack on the Soviet Union were conducted by the fascist criminals for at least a year and embraced not only Germany but also the satellite states, particularly Rumania, Finland, and Hungary.

3. The execution of the criminal designs of the fascist aggression, consisting of the extermination of the peaceful population, plunder, and the wresting from the Soviet Union of its territories was planned long before the attack on the USSR.

Fortunately for all freedom-loving nations, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet people, and its Red Army completely overthrew all the fiendish plans of the fascist invaders.

The Red Army not only withstood and arrested the fascist aggression but together with the armies of its allies, brought Hitler Germany to complete catastrophe and the fascist war criminals to the dock.

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